Neo-Ottomanism and modern Turkey. A republic looking to the past

Wojciech Harpula talks with Karolina Olszowska about contemporary Turkey.

Is Turkey a country that has reinvented itself?

Both yes and no. The Republic of Turkey, which is celebrating its centenary this year, was founded on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, furthermore radically rejecting its heritage. The historiography of the republic very often portrayed this country as a completely new entity – a state that was built thanks to the reforms of Mustafa Kemal, the hero of the Turkish War of Independence and its first president. This is not an entirely real picture. Indeed, Turkey is a country that had to reinvent itself because the centuries-old Ottoman Empire simply ceased to exist. Fighting in World War I alongside the Central Powers, it suffered defeat and the Allies decided to partition it. Kemal, one of the best Ottoman commanders during World War I, did not recognize the decision to partition. When in 1920 the sultan’s government, by signing the Treaty of Sèvres, accepted the partition and limitation of the territory of the country to a patch of northern Asia Minor, troops gathered in Anatolia began to fight the Allied occupation forces and also Greek and Armenian troops attacking the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. The fact that they were commanded by Mustafa Kemal was not obvious from the beginning, but during the War of Independence, which lasted from 1919 to 1922, he led the fighting troops. This war ended with the victory of the Turks. The Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923 restored the full sovereignty of Turkey in Anatolia as a whole and in eastern Thrace. It was signed by the new Turkish authorities as the sultanate had been abolished and the last sultan had to leave the country.

Kemal became the main figure of the new republic and, together with the elites gathered around him, he began to introduce reforms that would lead to the creation of the state and society according to modern European models. Yet ultimately they were merely a continuation of modernisation efforts from the period of reforms of the Ottoman Empire. Many changes were initiated during the Sultanate period, or at least, there were ideas for their implementation. Even the language reform, an extremely important change introduced in the republic, consisting in purifying the language from Arabic-Persian borrowings and changing the alphabet from Arabic to Latin, was invented in the times of the empire. There were already voices then that the spelling of words of Turkish origin in the Arabic alphabet was imperfect, and the number of loanwords from Persian and Arabic hindered communication. The reform of the language was written about in 1869 by Mustafa Celalettin Pasha (in fact a Polish emigrant called Konstanty Borzęcki) in his book “Old and Modern Turks”. Mustafa Kemal, on the margin of this book, simply wrote: “execute it.” To this day, the book can be seen in his mausoleum.

The difference between the sultan and Mustafa Kemal was that the latter had authority and enough power and determination to implement reforms without taking social discontent into account. During the war of national liberation, he gained an extremely strong position – society saw him as a providential man who saved the country. He ruled with a very firm hand and did not allow for any opposition. Thanks to this he had the tools to modernize the country. It cannot be denied that the changes were radical, and as a result, Turkey broke with its Ottoman and Islamic heritage.

What was the scale of the changes?

Huge. They were all meant to build a secular, modern state. A republic was established, religious courts were closed, religion was removed from schools, Islamic brotherhoods were banned, and public education was unified. The Gregorian calendar and secular legal codes modeled on European ones were introduced. Men were forbidden to wear fezzes. Wearing a fez in public was punishable by serious penalties. A devout Muslim should not leave the house without a head covering, therefore, after the introduction of the “hat reform”, European headgear disappeared from shops at a rapid pace. Ships full of used hats came from Europe, but their deficit was only satisfied after some time. Some conservative Turks did not leave the house until the end of their lives because they could not imagine that they could appear in public without a head covering. However, no one ever dared to ban women from wearing headscarves. They could not wear hijabs in schools and public institutions, but they could still have their hair covered on the street. Women were given the right to vote, and the new authorities did a lot to improve their social standing.

When Kemal married Latife Uşşaki, she was the first Turkish woman who signed the marriage certificate on her own, because it had been traditionally done by the father or other male head of the family. Latife became a symbol of the modern wife. She appeared by her husband’s side during public ceremonies (which was an absolute novelty in Turkey) often without covered hair and encouraged other women to do so. Kemal and Latife divorced after less than three years of marriage. It seems that Mustafa Kemal wanted to show what a modern marriage and divorce should look like, although – interestingly – he was to angrily use the traditional Islamic formula of threefold saying “I divorce you.”

Kemal adopted six children during his life, including only one boy. This was a clear signal to a patriarchal society in which male descendants were traditionally preferred and favored. It is worth noting, however, that he adopted already adult young people to enable them, among others, through education. One of his daughters, Sabiha Gökçen, became the first female aviator in Turkish history. Another of Kemal’s adopted daughters became a professor of art history and founded the Turkish History Society.

During the rule of Kemal, laws on the introduction of surnames were also passed. It was then that Kemal became Atatürk, “the father of the Turks” – a surname that no one else could use. We have already mentioned the reform of the language, which has had significant effects.

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Because as a result, the Turks were cut off from their cultural heritage. Islamic, full of Arab and Persian influences.

Along with the change of language, the Turks were separated from the Ottoman legacy. As the Ottoman language developed, it borrowed more and more words from Arabic, because the development of historiography and theology required specialized terminology. In literature, however, Persian influences were strong, which also resulted in borrowings in terms of vocabulary and syntax. At the same time, the discrepancy between the language spoken in the province and the language of the court deepened, because the former absorbed the expressions from other languages to a lesser degree. When the language reform was introduced in 1928, scholars estimated that the Ottoman language had about 60 percent of Arabic and Persian borrowings. Modern Turkish has about 10 percent of them.  The alphabet has also changed. Many people who spoke the Ottoman language became illiterate overnight, and Kemal himself reportedly took notes using the Arabic alphabet for the rest of his life.

Language reform meant that the Turks were cut off from the Ottoman past. And without knowledge of the Ottoman language, one cannot use sources, literature, diaries or old family letters. Most of the works or documents created in the Ottoman Empire must be translated into modern Turkish. Today, Turks are unable to understand their first constitution from 1876. It was the second constitution in the Islamic world, after the Egyptian one, which gave equal rights to religious minorities. For the average Turk, however, it is alien and incomprehensible.

Isn’t that what Kemal meant? He wanted to cut the Turks off from the heritage of the multinational empire and create a modern Turkish nation based on new patterns.

That is true. If society was to be secularized, it was necessary to find a central element of identity other than Islam. The attempt to create such an ideology was Kemalism, based on the so-called Six Arrows, which guided Atatürk in his policy. These were: republicanism, the rule of people, laicism, reformism, etatism and nationalism, understood as the equality of Turkish citizens regardless of religion or ethnic origin. The ruling Republican People’s Party adopted these principles in 1931 and incorporated them into the Turkish constitution in 1937. It is a Kemalist “confession of faith” and a political testament of Atatürk, who died a year later. An important reference for the formation of national identity was also the aforementioned war for the independence of Turkey.

However, one cannot agree with the claim, which often appeared in Turkish historiography, that Kemal created a new state and a new nation. Of course, he was the father of Turkey’s independence and the leading light in its modernization, but continuity between the Ottoman Empire and today’s Turkish state exists. Despite the efforts of the Kemalists, Islam has been and still is an important value for many citizens, and the sultans’ heritage is firmly rooted in the Turkish national sense. The Turks have not lost the impression that the achievements of the Ottomans are part of the history of their country.

The Turkish Republic was not created “out of nothing”, and Turkish society has not changed as fundamentally as the Kemalists would have liked to. Shortly after the death of Mustafa Kemal, in the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) there were demands for the return of religion to schools, and, when in 1946 parties other than the CHP were allowed to function, the Democratic Party achieved electoral success quite quickly. Its rule was overthrown in a military coup in 1960. Later, this pattern will be repeated: the army guarding “Atatürk’s testament” will intervene when the democratically elected authorities start to diverge – according to military personnel – too far from the path of Kemalism.

The currently ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) distances itself from Kemalism and refers to the Ottoman legacy, Islam has returned to being appreciated in public life. The ruling elites are closer to Neo-Ottomanism, in which the memory of the empire and thinking in terms of spheres of influence are rooted. It is not without reason that three years ago, Erdoğan turned the Hagia Sophia temple in Istanbul back into a mosque. It was an important act of symbolic policy. The decision of the Kemalist authorities in 1935 to establish a museum in the most important temple of the capital of the Ottoman Empire was a seal of the secularization of republican Turkey. Under Erdoğan, however, the process of rebuilding the state and redefining its identity took place. Turkey has ambitions to be the center of civilization of the Muslim world, which makes it the reverse of the secular Kemalist republic.

The history of the Republic of Turkey indicates that Islam has not been completely replaced by Kemalist values. Why?

Turkish society did not agree with the secularization of the state, but during the Kemalist reform fever, no one asked the Turks for their opinion. Reforms were introduced from above. The majority of society had to submit but did not agree with them. Even for the new Kemalist elites, the changes were not easy. Accounts of diplomats accredited in the new capital, Ankara have been preserved. The wives of Turkish ministers and important officials came to parties and banquets dressed in the European style. It was clear that they were incredibly embarrassed. They acted as if they were naked.

Kemalist reforms have not changed Turkish society in itself. They did not cause the Turks to abandon Islam. On the contrary – precisely because it was eliminated from the public sphere and the authorities did a lot to make it less important, it became a significant point of reference for many people. In fact, throughout the whole period of the republic’s functioning, some movements opposed secular reforms and demanded the appreciation of Islam. Turkish nationalism has not also been detached from Islam. Nationalists respect religion and consider it an essential component of Turkish identity.

The AKP came to power in 2002 on the wave of demands for the restoration of religion in public life. At that time, the party built an election campaign based on religious themes and achieved great success. This shows how long the Turks had been waiting for the emergence of a party that will allow religion to coexist with Turkish statehood. Also during the recent presidential elections in Turkey, the AKP announced that the defeat of Erdoğan would mean a return to the principle of laicism in public life. The opposition argued that it had no intention of banning the wearing of hijabs in schools and other state institutions, but a large part of the society believed that if the AKP lost, the new government would expel Islam from the public sphere. For many years in Turkey, religion was being removed from the life of the state, but it remained important for a large part of the society.

What exactly is Turkish Islam like? The Hanafi school professed there is considered to be the most open philosophically and religiously among all Sunni schools.

And so it is. In Poland, there is a narrative that Turkey is ruled by conservative Muslims. If a Muslim cleric from a Wahhabi Koranic school found himself on the streets of Istanbul or Ankara, he would probably say that he had landed in a country of infidels. People are dressed in European fashion, they drink alcohol, and nobody tells women to wear headscarves or cover their faces. In Turkey, the courts rule according to codes modeled on European legal solutions, not Sharia law. None of the leaders of the Muslim world would consider Erdoğan a conservative. He has led – only so much and as much – to the fact that Islam, which is deeply rooted in Turkish culture, has ceased to be expelled from the public sphere. Many religious people in Turkey believe that before he came to power, they were kept “under the heel” and subjected to top-down, secular processing. The Republic of Turkey is still a secular state, but the AKP rule has caused Islam to cease being treated as something shameful, a relic that should be hidden deep in the privacy of the home. In the rhetoric of the current authorities, it has become an integral and essential part of Turkishness. The consequences of such an approach to religion also have positive effects. Since women were allowed to wear headscarves in state institutions in 2013, the number of girls graduating from schools has increased by several hundred thousand. Previously, it often happened that conservative parents forbade girls who had reached the age at which they should, according to custom, cover their hair to go to school. Today, more women educate themselves, go to work, and become financially independent. The departure from the Kemalist dogma of laicism has reduced economic violence.

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Did the power of the AKP and Erdoğan grow out of the mistakes of the secular, modernist elites looking at Europe?

A very big problem of the elites created by the republic was that they did not understand Turkish society as a whole. Subsequent parties were created by intellectuals who did not see the problems of Turks living in the countryside, closely related to religion. They were not interested in agricultural, traditional Turkey. And even if they tried to take care of the needs of this part of the population, they did it inefficiently. They were not able to properly define the problems and take actions that would improve the situation of the rural part of society. The parties’ elites simply did not understand the village, it was something foreign to them.

In the 1930s, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu wrote a book called “Yaban”, meaning “The Wild”. He described in it a backward Turkish village: a lack of hygiene, modern work tools, and poverty. In 1935, he was accused of ridiculing the republic and violating its good name. Nobody noticed that this picture is real and something should be done to change it. This was perceived as an attack on the state. Such an attitude prevailed in the following years of the republic, regardless of which party was in power.

Only the AKP party saw the problems of a poorer, more religious and tradition-bound part of society. Thanks to this, it has gained and maintained power. When Erdoğan was the mayor of Istanbul, he took care of the poorest people. He led the sewage system to many districts, and improved refuse collection. He took care of the very basic needs of poor settlements, while hardly anyone had thought about it before. Erdoğan comes from a poor family himself, and as a child, he had to sell şimit, that is, Turkish bagels, to earn extra money for the household budget. Erdoğan was the first to notice the part of the Turks that had previously been ignored by all political forces. He provided pensions for housewives and relief for large families. During the 20 years of governance, the local headquarters of the AKP have become an important point for rural or small-town communities – for example, one can rent a hall for free for large family celebrations, or ask for help in dealing with some administrative procedure. For the poorer strata, Erdoğan is still a benefactor, a politician who took care of their problems and needs.

Atatürk’s heritage-protecting military overthrew four republic governments over the course of 40 years and controlled Turkish politics. How did the AKP manage to win the game against the army and secularists?

At the beginning of its rule, the AKP grouping had very large support – both in Turkish society and from Western countries. Erdogan’s party was seen as clearly pro-EU. It fought corruption and introduced many reforms that resulted in the comprehensive development of Turkey. In the West, it was said that the AKP and its electoral successes could be a model for the neighboring Arab world and an example of a successful marriage of democracy with Islam. The army had no reason to intervene for 10 years because the rulers had democratic legitimacy and did not violate Atatürk’s will flagrantly. In the past, when the military intervened, it did so with the support of Western countries. For the first two terms, the West supported Erdoğan. At that time, he introduced reforms that changed the structure of the army. As a result, the old Kemalist officers were exchanged for new people, more favorable to the AKP. Erdogan turned his back on Europe only after 10 years of his governance when it turned out that Turkey – despite its efforts – would not join the European Union. On the other hand, after the protests around Gezi Park in Istanbul in 2013, when about 8 million opponents of the president took to the streets, he also stiffened the course in domestic politics. For fear of losing power, the AKP turned towards authoritarianism. Part of the army finally intervened, but the putsch that took place on the night of July 15-16, 2016 failed. The military coup was pacified, and its defeat resulted in large-scale purges in the army and the state apparatus. Erdoğan managed to replace most of the command staff with people subordinate to the government. The military still does not support the president, but does not take any action anymore because it fears repression, it has been pacified.

You mentioned that Erdoğan turned away from Europe after 10 years of governance when it turned out that Turkey would not become a member of the European Union. Why didn’t Europe want Turkey?

There were at least several reasons, but in my opinion the most important one was that the accession of Turkey – with a population of almost 80 million – to the European Union would change the balance of power in its decision-making mechanisms. Its population potential would mean that Ankara would have a lot of seats in the bodies of the EU and would become a country which would significantly sway its fate. Few people want to voluntarily lose power and share political prerogatives. In addition, attention was paid to the problem of Kurdish separatism and the division of Cyprus into Turkish and Greek parts, existing since 1974. Cyprus joined the Union, but this applies to the southern Greek part of the island. No one in the world recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Cyprus and Greece opposed Turkey’s accession to the EU before the conditions under which the island could be unified were set. The attitude of the Greeks was a big disappointment for Turkey. The two countries share the baggage of a difficult history, and their mutual relations did not lack flashpoints, but in 1980 Turkey agreed to Greece’s return to NATO structures, from which it had withdrawn six years earlier. Turkey, on the other hand, could not count on a similar understanding from Greece in its accession efforts. The issue has now been raised in the context of the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. The Turkish elites stressed that they would no longer commit a “Greek mistake” – they would not agree to the accession of new countries until its conditions were met.

Currently, in EU-Turkey relations, we are dealing with a situation in which neither side wants to say goodbye first. Ultimately, Turkey did not declare that it was giving up its efforts to become a member, and the EU did not explicitly state that it did not see this country in its structures. We are dealing with a state of suspension that suits both Brussels and Ankara. If the opposition candidate won the recent presidential election, Europe would have a problem. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu declared that in case of his victory, accession talks would be resumed. The EU would have to react. If it deceived Turkey again, full responsibility for the failure of the talks would fall on Brussels. Europe should have a plan on what to do when Turkey knocks on its door again. If it hears once again from the West that it does not fit with Europe, it will be difficult for democratic, pro-Western circles in this country to accept it. Developing relations between the EU and Turkey is very important. These issues should not be swept under the carpet and pretended to have been solved and remain stable. Potential cooperation scenarios should be ready in case a return to EU-Turkey talks becomes possible. Erdoğan won another election. However, It is not known whether he will be able to govern for the next five years, because his health is getting weaker and weaker. It is also unclear whether he will not reorient his policy at some point. Scenarios for different circumstances are needed. They seem to be missing for the time being.

For now, after stopping the process of integration with the European Union, Erdoğan emphasizes issues related to Neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy. What does this mean in practice?

Neo-Ottomanism is nothing more than referring to the Ottoman heritage, emphasizing the achievements of the Ottoman Empire and the sultans. This is a significant difference compared to the time when the republic strictly adhered to the path marked out by Kemal. Neo-Ottomanism assumes the existence of a Turkish sphere of influence and the expansion of various activities in it. It is not about the annexation of areas that were once under Istanbul’s rule, but rather about activities in the field of economy and soft power. In the Balkans, Turkey invests, for example, in infrastructure and renovation of Ottoman-era monuments. In North Africa, it is present with development aid: it helps in the construction of schools, wells, and health centers. During the drought in Somalia, it rushed to provide humanitarian support. Today’s Turkey is interested in areas that in the past were part of the Ottoman state or which remained in the orbit of interest of Istanbul and is trying to be present in them. It works to create good, mutual relations with countries that grew up on the ruins of the empire. The results of such efforts differ. In the Balkans and Libya – they fare better, in the Middle East or Egypt – not at all…

However, depending on the situation, Ankara uses different narratives in foreign policy. Sometimes it also refers to pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. After all, Erdoğan asserted the rights of Muslims in Europe and presented himself as a defender of Islam. When he converted the Hagia Sophia into a mosque, he invited the leaders of the Islamic world to a ceremony. In the Muslim world, however, he has too many competitors, and it is difficult to expect Turkey to gain a dominant position within it. In turn, the idea of solidarity of all Turkic peoples is to be the key to enabling Ankara to expand its interests in Central Asia. Turkey is trying to make its presence known in Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan thanks to investments of companies operating under the political umbrella of the AKP, and in the background are Turkey’s strategic endeavors to run gas pipelines from Central Asia to Europe through its territory. In this aspect, however, it encounters countermeasures from Russia and China. And for now, these countries have more assets and more influence in this region of the world.

What role does Turkey want to play in the international arena?

It would like to be a strong player. A global power, or at least a regional one. It seeks to gain a unique position so that it can act as a mediator between the parties of various conflicts. This echoes the Ottoman times, when Turkey was considered a link between East and West, Asia and Europe. As the United States withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, the Turks demonstrated their readiness to talk to the Taliban. They want to be an intermediary in contacts between Europe and the Middle East and Russia and the Western world. Of course, the question remains whether such a policy of Turkey is effective. For now, its specific effects are not visible.