The State, the Swear Word, and the Limits of Speech

Penalties for profanity online

Kazakhstan has decided to “civilize” the internet by introducing penalties for profanity online. The use of “indecent language” on online platforms may now lead to a fine, community service, or detention. This is no longer about prosecuting defamation, incitement to violence, or criminal threats. It is about penalizing the very form of expression.

At first glance, this may look like an attempt to “civilize debate.” Anyone who has spent even a few hours on social media knows how easily discussion can turn into a sewer. That creates a temptation: since people cannot seem to learn basic civility on their own, perhaps the state should teach it for them. Yet this is precisely where the danger begins. Protection from verbal aggression can turn into control over language itself. Therefore, it can also become control over the way citizens express anger, rebellion, and dissent.

From the harm principle to the offense principle

The classic point of reference for liberal theories of freedom of speech is John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. According to Mill, coercion against an individual may be used only to prevent that person from causing real harm to others. Offence, shock, or moral discomfort alone rarely meet that condition.

A profanity, as such, does not wound in a way comparable to physical violence, theft, or even an organized campaign of hatred. The problem begins when harsh language combines with incitement to violence, persistent harassment, or the creation of a lynch-mob atmosphere.

When the state begins to punish the mere “use of profanity,” it moves away from the logic of protection against harm and toward the logic of protection against offence, as described by Joel Feinberg. This principle allows certain restrictions on individual liberty. As a result, it can protect others from extreme, unavoidable experiences of humiliation.

Feinberg, however, warned against applying this principle too broadly. The feeling of offence is subjective, culturally variable, and vulnerable to political abuse. Once the state places it on its banner, it can easily start punishing people not for real harm. Instead, people may be punished for violating the dominant sensibility.

The argument that sounds reasonable

Supporters of penalties for profanity are not without arguments. They point out that without real sanctions, verbal aggression online spins out of control. Moreover, more vulnerable people — children, teenagers, people outside the mainstream — simply disappear from the public sphere because they cannot endure constant hate.

They also argue that if we tolerate language completely detached from basic decency, we effectively hand debate over to the loudest and most brutal voices. In doing so, we disturb the democratic equality of access to speech. In this view, penalties for profanity are not an attack on freedom of speech. Rather, they are a tool for saving it by raising the minimum standard of conversation.

The problem begins when this argument about “civilising discussion” merges with the broad discretionary power of the state. Then what was meant to protect the vulnerable can easily become a way to selectively silence anger that the authorities consider too loud, too ugly, or simply too inconvenient.

When language becomes a tool of control

Penalties for profanity are presented as a defence of public order and morality. In practice, however, they come down to a simple question: may people use “bad words” in a space the state considers public? The move seems innocent enough. After all, it concerns only form, not content. But in politics, form and content are intertwined.

Aggressive, colloquial language, thick with swear words, is often the language of protest, the street, memes, and anti-system irony. By cutting off that register, the state does not merely “clean up” debate. It also weakens the most expressive form of dissent.

The category of public morality is used to produce a model of the “good citizen”: calm, moderate, and careful not to cross linguistic boundaries. Such a citizen is less confrontational. Therefore, they are less capable of a sudden, symbolic break with the existing order.

Online profanity laws: what can we say?

There is also the problem of vagueness. Categories such as “vulgar,” “indecent,” and “offensive” are fluid by definition. What one person sees as an innocent swear word may be a cause for outrage to another. To someone else, it might be a normal part of everyday speech.

Once punishment for profanity becomes legitimate, someone — a police officer, a prosecutor, a judge — must decide where the boundary lies. The issue, then, is not only what may be said. Indeed, it is also about who has the right to decide what counts as “decent” and what counts as “crude.”

Almost incidentally, a chilling effect also appears. Users who see that a swear word in a comment may lead to punishment will begin to censor not only profanity, but also sharp criticism, ironic memes, and more uncompromising satire. It will be safer to remain silent. Alternatively, it will be safer to speak only in a mild language stripped of stronger formulations.

Emotional safety versus freedom of speech

In European liberal democracies, the tension between freedom of speech and the need for protection against hate speech, persistent harassment, and disinformation is growing. The debate turns mainly on when words truly threaten another person’s rights and safety. Conversely, sometimes they “merely” offend or shock.

The Kazakh example shows how easily this dispute can move one step further: from the question “may the state punish incitement to violence?” to the question “may the state punish unattractive language?” That second step may seem small, but its consequences are different in kind. We move from the realm of harm into the realm of aesthetics and custom. In these spheres, the state should act with the greatest caution.

How do we understand freedom of speech?

Ultimately, the stakes in the dispute over penalties for profanity are the meaning of freedom of speech in the digital age. If the internet is to be, above all, an emotionally “safe” space, we will be inclined to give the state more and more tools for regulating what we say and how we say it.

If, however, we accept that freedom of speech necessarily involves the risk of offence, shock, and confrontation with someone else’s vulgarity, we will be more likely to limit legal intervention to cases of real harm.

Kazakhstan has clearly chosen the first path. The question is whether, in the name of “civilising” debate, Europe is moving closer to online profanity laws than we would like to admit.

Read this article in Polish: Areszt za brzydkie słowa. Czy tu na pewno chodzi o kulturę?