Science
The Sahara Stone That Remembers a Vanished World
27 June 2026
At first it is a port, a highway, or a railway line. Then come Chinese loans, Chinese companies, and political gratitude. The Belt and Road Initiative was meant to build trade and development. Today it increasingly looks like a map of Chinese influence spreading across the world.
Chancay is the latest and most spectacular Latin American “fruit” of Xi Jinping’s vast foreign project. Located 60 kilometers north of Lima, the capital of Peru, the port of Chancay is on track to soon rise to the top of the list of the largest ports in Latin America. It is no surprise that in November 2024 Xi Jinping himself attended its opening. The port is Chinese-owned, and Beijing invested more than 3 billion dollars in its construction.
This colossus, envisioned by Beijing as a maritime gateway to Latin America, is part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the “New Silk Road.” It is a vast infrastructure and economic project — with a significant dose of geopolitics — announced by Xi Jinping in 2013, at the beginning of his rule. The BRI is a network of roads, rail corridors, and ports designed to facilitate Chinese economic expansion and anchor Beijing’s influence not only in Asia and Africa, but also in Europe and even in the United States’ “backyard.”
Such projects as Chancay have long concerned the United States. At the opening of the Peruvian megaport (under the Biden administration), General Laura Richardson, head of U.S. Southern Command responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean, called it a security concern for America. “It could be used as a dual-use facility,” she warned, referring to both civilian and military applications.
Colonel Grant Newsham, a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer and analyst at the Center for Security Policy, shares a similar view. For years he has studied China’s global expansion.
BRI infrastructure such as ports and airports is also dual-use and is built with future deployment of the People’s Liberation Army in mind. A good example is the massive port recently opened in Chancay, Peru, but similar cases can be found around the world,
– he says for Holistic News, referring to his book When China Attacks: A Warning to America.
BRI is not only about building infrastructure. Acquiring stakes or management rights in ports — from South America through Greece to Djibouti — also serves potential military purposes. Equally important are intelligence-gathering opportunities, for example when Huawei forms the backbone of telecommunications infrastructure in African countries, Pacific islands, or Latin America. There are also possibilities for “covert offensive actions,” such as China disabling ports or electronic infrastructure through cyber operations embedded in these systems,
– he adds.
China, on the other hand, insists that BRI is a major civilizational project that is peaceful and aimed at improving living standards in partner countries. The U.S.–China dispute over BRI became especially visible during last year’s controversy over the Panama Canal, when Donald Trump argued that the United States must regain control over this strategic passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
Under American pressure, Panama first removed Chinese operators from two canal ports and shortly afterward withdrew entirely from the BRI, angering Beijing. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson declared that China “firmly opposes U.S. pressure and coercion aimed at undermining cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative.”
Despite this reaction, Panama’s withdrawal was not a strategic defeat for China, as nearly 150 countries participate in the initiative, representing over 60 percent of the world’s population. Since 2013, China has invested more than 1 trillion dollars in BRI projects, mostly in the form of loans. Still, Panama’s exit represents a symbolic setback for Xi Jinping’s global project aimed at extending Chinese influence into the American “backyard.”
Seeing Beijing’s growing influence, the United States and the European Union launched competing initiatives: the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, developed under the Biden administration within the G7, and the EU’s Global Gateway. However, these efforts are already significantly delayed and operate on a much smaller scale than the BRI.
Here the advantage of an authoritarian system becomes visible. In implementing projects, Chinese planners do not ask governments in Africa, Asia, or South America whether they meet human rights standards. China explicitly states that its mission is not to promote democracy but to deliver concrete projects that “strengthen economic ties” and improve living conditions.
The BRI also lacks the anti-corruption safeguards typical of Western development projects. For many kleptocratic regimes, this is an undeniable advantage. And if a country cannot repay its Chinese loans? In the worst case, the infrastructure passes into Chinese hands. This happened with the Hambantota International Port in Sri Lanka, leased to China for 99 years in 2017.
In the West, this was labeled “debt-trap diplomacy,” although China argues that such cases are rare and comparable to commercial practices elsewhere. However, one key difference remains: Chinese loans under BRI are state capital, closely aligned with long-term geopolitical strategy.

The Belt and Road Initiative does, in fact, have an economic dimension — and a very significant one. Among other things, it allows China to leverage its enormous capacity in the construction sector to carry out projects around the world. As a result, the Communist Party of China can maintain employment and, at times, even generate profit, although the money is often lent by Chinese institutions and then “recycled” as borrowing firms repay their loans.
— says Col. Newsham in an interview with Holistic News.
However, in reality, the BRI primarily serves to expand China’s global influence, particularly in developing countries, but also in many middle-income states such as Malaysia or Serbia. When China builds roads, ports, pipelines, and so on, it also builds influence — especially among political elites. This in turn leads to political alignment with China and to the securing of support votes in the UN and other international organizations.
At the same time, it draws these countries away from the West, and especially from the United States. The BRI also involves a significant scale of corruption and direct bribery in target countries, which further “buys” influence among local elites, but also among people at much lower levels of the political hierarchy.
Despite all the influence the initiative has brought to Beijing, it has also contributed to the accumulation of massive debt in dozens of poor countries. China has also directed contracts to its own companies, and in some cases has built costly, low-quality projects that failed to stimulate economic growth.
— the New York Times assessed in its analysis of China’s project.
From the very beginning, the Belt and Road Initiative has not been solely about granting loans, but also about promoting China’s political vision — much like the West has long used development aid to support democracy.
So where did the idea for the BRI come from in the first place? When Xi Jinping took power in Beijing, China’s economy was “overheated.” For several years, the state had been fueling a construction boom domestically, and China’s production capacity in the building sector had expanded to enormous proportions. As the sector faced a potential collapse, Xi Jinping decided to redirect this unused capacity abroad — to build projects by Chinese companies under the BRI framework. The idea was also wrapped in a historical narrative, comparing it to the ancient Silk Road.

Reuters, in a recent analysis, assesses this gigantic plan — the largest foreign project in history undertaken by a single state — as a success for Xi, illustrating with data how the Belt and Road Initiative is stimulating exports from the People’s Republic of China.
So far, the concept of the Belt and Road Initiative as a grand strategy aimed at boosting trade has produced results. In the decade leading up to 2025, China’s trade with BRI partners increased by 240 percent, reaching 3.4 trillion dollars, significantly outpacing the 64 percent growth in China’s total trade over the same period.
— Reuters reported in May this year.
In addition, the BRI also helps promote the internationalization of the yuan.
This last issue is particularly important for Beijing, which is seeking to reduce the role of the US dollar. A simple indicator illustrates this trend. Last year, 30 percent of China’s trade with BRI partners was settled in yuan, whereas a decade earlier it was only a few percent.
Where does Poland stand in this global project? Does its location on a BRI railway route translate into economic gain?
Dr. Michał Bogusz, senior analyst at the China Research Team at the Centre for Eastern Studies, tempers expectations. According to him, the benefits for Poland are minimal because logistics companies capture transit fees, while customs and VAT revenues go to destination countries — usually Western Europe, mainly Germany.
He also warns that participation in the BRI carries risks. Countries that joined after the 2008 crisis often discovered that the terms were favorable primarily to China. Projects are built by Chinese firms, financed by relatively expensive Chinese loans, and backed by state guarantees from recipient countries.
If an investment fails, the debt still remains with the host country.
This is Chinese “real geopolitics”: a systematically built network of dependencies abroad that serves Beijing’s interests. And the West? It remains slow, fragmented, and underfunded — as if the game were not one of economic survival.
Read this article in Polish: Nowy Jedwabny Szlak. Tak Chiny oplatają świat